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Abstract 
Many changes have taken place over the past eight years in almost every sphere of the 
business world. The first topic discussed within this paper will be the origin and 
background of Sarbanes-Oxley, why it was necessary, and what the primary causes of 
such regulation were. There are many new regulations that are required of companies, 
primarily publicly-traded companies, which will be covered in the next section. Finally, 
the last discussion will involve the impact of SOX and the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board on financial reporting and the changes that have taken place within 
companies. The impact of this legislation, according to President Bush, was “the most far 
reaching reforms of American business practices since the time of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt” (President Bush, 2002, para. 4). 
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The Effects of Sarbanes Oxley on Current Financial Reporting Standards 
Introduction 
Financial reporting has changed a great deal over the past ten years. There have 
been many companies that have come and gone, some with little fanfare, and some with 
the explosion akin to the Macy’s Fourth of July fireworks display. There have been 
various reasons why these companies have left the operating sphere: the inability to make 
a profit, poor business decisions, and low marketability. However, one of the most 
notable reasons why certain companies go under is unethical behavior in the workplace 
(Pitt, 2009). When exposed, the lack of ethics scandalized the corporate, as well as the 
public, world. In order “to protect investors by improving the accuracy and reliability of 
corporate disclosures made pursuant to the securities laws, and for other purposes,” 
Congress published the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 (SOX 2002, para. 1). The Securities 
and Exchange Commission, or SEC, enforces the application of the regulations contained 
within Sarbanes Oxley. This Act dealt with intensifying financial reporting regulations 
and the punishments for non-cooperation (Berman, Knight, & Case 2008). Throughout 
this paper, the effects of Sarbanes Oxley, otherwise known as SOX, will be dealt with 
and discussed concerning various different aspects of financial reporting.  
Background of Sarbanes Oxley 
Prior to 2002, the regulations on financial reporting were much more lax than they 
are currently. Companies were more apt to be under the radar if they desired to engage in 
fraudulent financial practices. Since the enactment of the Sarbanes Oxley Act in 2002, all 
publicly-traded companies have been required to comply with regulatory policies. Many 
of these policies had been in existence before SOX, but they were not enforced. This Act 
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was intended to prevent potential scandals and to re-establish investor assurance (Miller, 
& Pashkoff, 2002). Following high-profile cases such as Enron, which obliterated any 
confidence investors may have had, SOX was a crucial piece of legislation. SOX was 
also meant to reinforce corporate responsibility, strengthen disclosure, and fight against 
fraud (Hoyle, Schaefer, & Doupnik, 2011). There were many corporate scandals that 
occurred during the past century, but none received the amount of publicity that Enron 
and its auditor, Arthur Anderson did.  
The Enron Scandal 
Enron scandalized the business world in 2001 and 2002 when the internal fraud of 
the company was uncovered. Since its inception, Enron sustained burdensome debt. At 
times the financial state of the company promised success. However, Enron never fully 
recovered from the debt with which it was created. The laxity of internal control within 
Enron ultimately led to the company’s demise (Thomas, 2002).  
 Formation of the company. Enron was created in 1985 as a result of a merger 
between two companies, Houston Natural Gas and InterNorth (Thomas, 2002). The 
merger saddled Enron with an enormous amount of debt which proved to be the 
beginning of the end (Fusaro, & Miller, 2002). When a company begins its life on a 
shaky foundation, it is safe to assume that the company will not last long without very 
drastic changes. The CEO of Enron in 1985 was Kenneth Lay, who hired a consultant 
named Jeffrey Skilling of McKinsey & Co. to help formulate Enron’s business plan 
(Thomas). A portion of Skilling’s business plan proposed inventing a gas bank where gas 
would be purchased from a system of merchants which would in turn be sold to a system 
of clients, resulting in constant cash flows throughout the process (Fusaro, et al.). 
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Skilling’s plan pleased Mr. Lay, and he hired Skilling to be in charge of Enron Finance 
Corp., which was created in 1990 (Thomas). Over the ensuing eleven years, Skilling led 
the company through a period of exponential growth. However, he was not alone during 
this growth process. In 1990, following the creation of Enron Finance Corporation, 
Skilling hired Andrew Fastow to be his protégé (Thomas). Fastow became the chief 
financial officer in 1998, and controlled Enron’s investing and funding while Skilling 
directed the enhancement of Enron’s trading operation (Thomas). One of the primary 
reasons for Enron’s rapid growth was the extensiveness of the U.S. economy’s bull 
market (Thomas). Unfortunately, this growth was only temporary.  
 The destruction of Enron. In 1996, Enron named Jeffrey Skilling as the chief 
operating officer, or COO (Thomas, 2002). This position of power engendered more 
greed and the temptation to pursue unethical decisions in the business policies. In 
October of 1999, Enron Online, or EOL, was born (Fusaro, & Miller, 2002). EOL was a 
trading website in which electronic commodities were being sold (Thomas). This 
program enabled Enron to witness every business deal that occurred, and also permitted 
the company to enhance Enron’s credit due to the confidence generated in a safe 
purchasing environment (Thomas). Unfortunately, Enron took advantage of the growing 
stock bubble by investing hundreds of millions of dollars into Internet broadband but 
with minor profit. This investment did increase the stock price, which increased investor 
confidence because after all, if the stock price is high, should not the company be doing 
well? Sadly, the increased stock price and investor confidence masked the true condition 
of Enron. As the Internet age blossomed and grew, other companies copied Enron’s 
strategies, thus causing Enron to lose the edge it had held for several years (Thomas). 
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With the previously set high standard, the profitability of financing deals did not concern 
executives at Enron, rather they focused on keeping the numbers from appearing low 
(Thomas). Enron became more of a hedge fund company rather than a trading company 
(Fusaro, et al.). Eventually, Enron’s poor risk management came back to haunt the 
company. Toward the end of 2001, Enron was forced to file for bankruptcy protection 
(Bottiglieri, Reville, & Grunewald, 2009). The events that followed this filing proved to 
be the company’s undoing. While they received the desired protection, they also were 
forced to disclose faulty accounting practices, both with Enron and also with their 
accounting firm, Arthur Anderson (Bottiglieri, Reville, & Grunewald). In a period of less 
than a year, Enron was dissolved, and legislation, SOX, was passed in an attempt to 
prevent the falsification of data and lessen the probability for insider trading to occur in 
the future. 
Increase in Regulations after Sarbanes Oxley 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act initiated stringent regulations. The Act was composed of 
sixty-six sections, some long and others short. Each section dealt with a different part of 
the reporting cycle (Schaeffer, 2006). These sections are contained within eleven titles, 
primarily dealing with the issue of internal control. The eleven titles of SOX are as 
follows: Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, auditor independence, corporate 
responsibility, enhanced financial disclosures, analyst conflicts of interest, commission 
resources and authority, studies and reports, corporate and criminal fraud accountability, 
white-collar crime penalty enhancements, corporate tax returns, corporate fraud and 
accountability (SOX, 2002). Each of these titles has its own specific impact on different 
areas of financial reporting, but only a few will be discussed in detail within this paper.  
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Important Accommodations 
 While it is important for companies to follow every section of SOX, there have 
been several sections that received more attention than others. A common section of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act is Title III, Corporate Responsibility. This portion of the legislation 
contains many important guidelines regarding the duties of management, including 
certain audit committee requirements as seen in Section 301 (SOX, 2002). A few other 
notable common sections are Section 401 (b), conditions for use of non-US GAAP or pro 
forma financial information, and Section 404, internal control over financial reporting 
(Rulemaking, 2009). Another very important section is covered by Title XI, Corporate 
Fraud and Accountability (SOX). Title XI deals with the penalties and regulations 
companies must comply with to avoid fraudulent practices. The last portion of Sox that 
will be discussed is Title I, creation of the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, 
or PCAOB (Rulemaking). 
Corporate Responsibility 
 Title III of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act contains several important sections dealing 
with corporate responsibility. While only a few will be gone into depth in this paper, 
every section is incredibly vital. Each section contains a particular amount of pertinent 
information for all forms of companies that comply. The eight sections of Title III are as 
follows: section 301, public company audit committees (expanded below), (302) 
corporate responsibility for financial reports, (303) improper influence on conduct of 
audits, (304) forfeiture of certain bonuses and profits, (305) officer and director bars and 
penalties, (306) insider trades during pension fund blackout periods, (307) rules of 
professional responsibility for attorneys, and (308) fair funds for investors (SOX, 2002).  
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 Sections 302-308. Each of these sections involves a portion of corporate 
responsibility. Within Title III, the entire spectrum of financial reporting is covered, 
which gives credence to the importance of proper reporting. Section 302, corporate 
responsibility for financial reports, deals with the specific requirements for managers and 
chief executives of companies to comply with (SOX, 2002). One of these requirements is 
to ensure that the financial report “does not contain any untrue statement of a material 
fact or omit to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements made, in 
light of the circumstances under which such statements were made, not misleading” 
(Kranacher, 2011, para. 4). When a company’s financial statements are in order and 
correctly represented, investors are able to make wiser investing decisions. In addition, 
individuals are more likely to have confidence in the company (Kranacher). The next 
section, improper influence on conduct of audits, is very similar to section 404 (internal 
control). The legislation states actions that are prohibited:  
It shall be unlawful…for any officer or director of an issuer to take any action to 
fraudulently influence, coerce, manipulate, or mislead any independent public or 
certified accountant engaged in the performance of an audit of the financial 
statements of that issuer for the purpose of rendering such financial statements 
materially misleading. (SOX, 2002, p. 33) 
Section 304, forfeiture of certain bonuses and profits, explains that if a company is 
required to restate its financial statements on account of misconduct, the CEO and CFO 
are responsible for compensating the company (Kleckner, & Jackson, 2004). The items 
they would be accountable for in the event of misstated financial statements would be (a) 
bonus or other compensation received during the 12-month time span after the issuance 
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of financial statements or (b) any profits realized from the sale of securities during the 
same 12-month period (Kleckner, et al., 2004). The next section under Title III covers the 
penalties that apply to officers and directors when they are deemed unsuitable (SOX, 
2002). These penalties also include providing “equitable relief” when necessary in order 
to benefit investors (SOX). Section 306, insider trades during pension fund blackout 
periods, mandates prior notice be communicated to individuals who are prohibited from 
making investment changes, procuring loans, or receiving a distribution from tax-
qualified plans during a blackout period (Pett, Stevens, & Mao, 2003). A blackout period 
is defined as the following: “periods during which participants cannot direct the 
investment of their plan account balances or request loans or distributions” (Pett, et al., 
para. 1). The Sarbanes-Oxley Act expands upon this definition by specifying the time 
period as “three or more consecutive business days” (Pett, et al., para. 13). Whenever a 
firm decides to implement a blackout period, they are required to provide notice to the 
proper individuals. This notice must include the following information: (a) the reason for 
the blackout; (b) details of which transactions are affected by the blackout period; (c) the 
start and end dates of the period; (d) the contact information of who can be questioned 
about the blackout period (Pett, et al.). The next section, rules of professional 
responsibility for attorneys, covers items that attorneys are required to report when they 
are working in conjunction with an audit committee (SOX, 2002). The last section under 
Title III, fair funds for investors, provides additional assistance to investors who have 
been subject to the effects of fraudulent practices. 
Audit committee requirements. An effectively operating audit committee is one 
of the most essential elements of internal control over financial reporting (Gramling, 
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Hermanson, & Hermanson, 2009). Section 301 in the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 
contains six components dealing with different requirements that are necessary for audit 
committees to have (SOX, 2002). These sections are as follows: commission rules, 
responsibilities relating to registered public accounting firms, independence, complaints, 
authority to engage advisors, and funding (SOX). Along with complying with these 
requirements, auditors are responsible to rotate their audits with another registered 
auditor (Miller & Pashkoff, 2002). This rotation is meant to aid in independence and 
objectivity. The SOX legislation defines an audit committee as follows:  
A committee (or equivalent body) established by and amongst the board of 
directors of an issuer for the purpose of overseeing the accounting and financial 
reporting processes of the issuer and audits of the financial statements of the 
issuer; and if no such committee exists with respect to an issuer, the entire board 
of directors of the issuer. (SOX, p. 2) 
According to research conducted in 2009, since the execution of SOX, audit committee 
effectiveness has improved (Gramling, et al., 2009). In order to be effective, these 
committees should comply with the requirements provided in Section 301. The purpose 
of those requirements is to aid in effectiveness (Gramling, et al.). A strategic weakness of 
the requirement to have an audit committee is with small companies. Many small 
companies are unable to provide a separate audit committee because they have an 
extremely limited staff (Gramling, et al.). However, SOX section 205 has a potential 
loophole for this dilemma. This section gives the provision that if a separate audit 
committee is not available or in existence, the full board may act as the audit committee 
(Gramling, et al.). In order to remain in compliance with independence and objectivity 
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requirements, it is vital that those members of the committee are not part of management 
(Gramling, et al., 2009). It can be difficult for any audit committee to remain unbiased in 
every aspect of the word, but it is also important for the committee to remove any bias 
from the management of the firm (Caskey, Nagar, & Petacchi, 2010). The manager has a 
vested interest in the company, and rightly so, however that interest has the potential to 
cause them to make poor business decisions. This is one reason why SOX was published 
and then implemented: to detract from non-objective individuals in management (Caskey, 
et al.).  
Use of Non-U.S. GAAP or Pro Forma Financial Information 
 When speaking of foreign companies, most do not follow U.S. Generally 
Accepted Accounting Principles, hereafter referred to as GAAP. Many foreign companies 
follow the International Financial Reporting Standards, or IFRS, rather than GAAP. 
However, for a company that does not prepare their statements according to IFRS, the 
SEC requires their financial statements to be in accordance with GAAP (Parrino, & Sung, 
2009). Section 401(b) of SOX discusses the rules and regulations that concern how a 
company can present figures from their financial statements and remain in compliance 
with SOX (SOX, 2002). For those companies that are registered in the US, with the SEC 
or PCAOB, section 401(b) requires two disclosures: (a) “a presentation of the most 
comparable financial measure calculated in accordance with GAAP”; (b) “a 
reconciliation of the differences between that measure and the non-GAAP measure” 
(Rulemaking, 2009, para. 31). These disclosures come as a result of the SEC’s 
Regulation G, adopted in January 2003 (Rulemaking). While this regulation was adopted 
in January, it was put into effect until March 28, 2003 (Marques, 2006). Regulation G is 
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believed by some to imply that the SEC considers more transparency and consistency in 
filing and providing information to be more beneficial to investors (Marques). Prior to the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act, the SEC came to the realization that investors desiring to put capital 
into firms who did not comply with GAAP might be mislead if the firms masked GAAP 
results (Marques, 2006). Because of this realization, and as a provision to SOX, the SEC 
proposed Regulation G and additional changes to the filing and furnishing rules, with the 
intent “to ensure that investors and others are not misled by the use of non-GAAP 
financial measures” (Marques, p. 550). The information that is now required to be 
disclosed to the investors may aid them in their investing decisions. This information will 
permit the investors the ability to choose if they concur with the adjustments seen in the 
firm or if they prefer to reverse these adjustments (Marques). According to one 
researcher, “the frequency of reporting non-GAAP earnings and other financial measures 
in quarterly earnings press releases did not change with the SEC interventions” (Marques, 
p. 554). This research appears to show that those firms which originally reported with 
pro-forma financial statements continued to do so, and firms which did report in 
accordance with GAAP continued their reporting as well. However, it is important to 
point out that firms registered with the SEC in the United States must comply with 
GAAP in their published financial statements, even if their own company statements 
continue to be in pro-forma format. 
Internal Control  
Although internal control was one of the major issues being addressed in the 
Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002, certain rules were not established until nearly a year after 
the publication of SOX. One of the most important provisions of SOX is the necessity to 
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employ internal controls in an attempt to prevent, detect, and deter fraud (Moffett, & 
Grant, 2011). The two sections of the legislation that affected internal control the most 
are Sections 302 and 404 (Thevenot, & Hall, 2011). Section 302, corporate responsibility 
for financial reports, is more of a practical application of the internal controls. This 
particular section requires the management of a company to (a) establish and maintain 
internal controls; (b) design internal controls to guarantee that material information which 
relates to the issuer and its subsidiaries is communicated to the officers with the entities; 
(c) evaluate the internal controls’ efficiency within ninety days prior to the report; (d) 
present their conclusions in the report concerning the effectiveness of the internal 
controls based on the evaluation (SOX, 2002). Section 404, or management assessment 
of internal controls, requires each annual report to contain a report on internal controls 
and their effectiveness within the company (SOX). These vital sections changed the 
previous reporting standards and now require management to present an analysis of the 
design and efficiency of firms’ internal controls (Thevenot, et al.). Efficient internal 
controls aid a business or firm with financial reporting, compliance, and operations 
(Moffett, et al., 2011). However, it should be stressed that internal controls are not an 
assurance that companies will be able to function with perfection. Controls may fail for 
various reasons, such as poor human judgment, negligence, or simple input errors 
(Moffett, et al.). However, in a report published in 2008 by the ACFE, or Association of 
Certified Fraud Examiners, internal controls were able to uncover fraud in 23.3 percent of 
cases analyzed (Moffett, et al.). 
Section 404. The reporting requirements of SOX section 404 first became 
applicable to accelerated filers in 2004. This particular section of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
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mandates that company management and their external auditors testify concerning the 
efficiency of internal controls over financial reporting (Moffett, et al., 2011). Section 404 
also requires the firms to file their report on internal controls with the SEC in order to 
divulge any noteworthy control deficiencies and material control weaknesses (Moffett, et 
al., 2011). It is necessary to specify that only material weaknesses need be divulged. 
Those that are not considered material are assumed to have little importance (Thevenot, 
et al., 2011). 
Fraud prevention. Because of all the uncertainty Enron’s meltdown caused, 
many employees of companies in the United States were afraid to come forward to reveal 
fraudulent practices because they feared losing their jobs. In April of 2003, the U.S. 
Securities and Exchange Commission published an addition to Section 301 of SOX 
(Rulemaking, 2009). This addition provided protection to employees who would come 
forward and disclose pertinent information. One of the primary purposes of a company 
having internal controls in place is to prevent fraud. Without the presence of effective and 
strong internal controls, companies are extremely susceptible to fraudulent activities 
(Moffett, et al., 2011). 
Weaknesses. A major weakness of internal control systems surprisingly comes 
from the management of the company. Management has the ability to damage or 
reinforce these systems by the way they interact with the company and the employees 
(Moffett, et al., 2011). According to an article published in Internal Auditing by Ryan 
Moffett and Gerry Grant, management override and collusion with the other individuals 
employed at the firm have proven to be the largest danger (2011). In research conducted 
by Maya Thevenot and Linda Hall, certain deficiencies in internal controls have been 
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linked to poor accrual quality, poor board and audit committee quality, firm risk, and the 
cost of equity capital (2011). Furthermore, many firms with serious control flaws have a 
tendency to be smaller, less monetarily sound, have more involved operations and smaller 
amounts of resources (Thevenot, et al., 2011). These firms are unable to invest the proper 
funding into creating a secure system of internal controls, which causes them to be less 
confident. There are two types of weaknesses: account-specific and entity-level 
deficiencies. Those that are considered account-specific are regarded as less severe 
because they are linked to specific financial statement accounts, such as inventory, 
receivables, and intangibles (Thevenot, et al.). On the other hand, entity-level weaknesses 
have a far-reaching impact on the firm. They affect larger areas, such as “recognition and 
segregation of duties” and tend to be a sign of company-wide weak control environment 
(Thevenot, et al., para. 14). 
Corporate Fraud and Accountability 
 Many companies that experience fraud on any level are typically searching for 
ways to lessen the potential for fraud. Title XI of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, Corporate 
Fraud and Accountability, seeks to alleviate the longevity of the search (SOX, 2002). 
This particular section contains severe consequences for both individuals and companies 
alike who engage in fraudulent practices. One such consequence applies to any individual 
who attempts to tamper with documents or official proceeding. These individuals would 
be subject to a fine or placed in prison for up to twenty years (SOX). Title XI contains six 
applicable sections with penalties and regulations: tampering with a record or otherwise 
impeding an official proceeding (1102), temporary freeze authority for the SEC (1103), 
amendment to the federal sentencing guidelines (1104), authority of the commission to 
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prohibit persons from serving as officers or directors (1105), increased criminal penalties 
under Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (1106), and retaliation against informants (1107) 
(SOX, 2002). Each of these sections was meant to instill a particular emotion so as to 
decrease the desire to commit such practices. Section 1107 specifically states what 
actions would be taken against informants:  
Whoever knowingly, with the intent to retaliate, takes any action harmful to any 
person, including interference with the lawful employment or livelihood of any 
person, for providing to a law enforcement officer any truthful information 
relating to the commission or possible commission of any Federal offense, shall 
be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than ten years, or both. (SOX, p. 
65) 
Recent research provides evidence of the specific types of individuals who would take 
the chance to inform the authorities of fraudulent practices. Such individuals have been 
identified as (a) employees of the company, (b) industry regulators, (c) press journalists, 
(d) equity holders and their analysts, (e) securities regulators, and (f) auditors (Bolt-Lee, 
Farber, & Moehrle, 2011). As is evident by the variety of individuals who have been 
categorized as informants, one need not be an employee of a company to discover 
fraudulent information.  
Public Company Accounting Oversight Board 
 The Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, or PCAOB, was created as a 
result of SOX. However, the PCAOB is not an entity of the United States government, 
but rather is a nonprofit corporation under the jurisdiction of the District of Columbia 
(Spillane, 2004). This board is run by five members from various backgrounds. Members 
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have a five-year term, with the option to serve an additional five years (Kranacher, 2008). 
The primary purpose of the PCAOB is to “protect investors by improving the accuracy 
and reliability of financial reports” (Kranacher, p. 1). Compliance with four key 
responsibilities is required when considering the administration procedures for the 
accounting-related portions of Sarbanes-Oxley: registration, standards, inspections, and 
enforcement (Lauriello, Leauby, Welsh 2010).  
The main purpose of the PCAOB is to ensure that registered public accounting 
firms are following SOX, PCAOB regulations, SEC regulations, professional values and 
also the firm’s quality control policies (Lauriello, et al., 2010). The PCAOB has not been 
the easiest nor the cheapest regulation with which to comply. However, nearly a decade 
after the publication of Sarbanes-Oxley, many companies are beginning to appreciate the 
benefits of compliance. 
Registration 
Registration with the PCAOB is required by SOX. This registration period takes a 
minimum of forty-five days, and could take longer if the correct information is not sent 
(Berger, 2010). There are three potential actions that may occur after the initial 
application is submitted: “approval, issuance of a notice of a hearing, or request for 
additional information” (Berger, para. 4). The two items that would require a lengthier 
registration period would be the issuance of a notice, or the request for additional 
information. Once these items have been sent out, a new forty-five day period begins 
(Berger). As of 2008, there were approximately 1,800 firms that had completed 
registration with the PCAOB (Kranacher, 2008). The Sarbanes-Oxley legislation 
mandates the PCAOB to gather a preliminary registration fee and also an annual fee from 
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those firms which have registered (Berger). These fees help offset some of the PCAOB’s 
expenses, since it is a nonprofit organization (Berger). The due date for the annual fee is 
July 31 of every year the firm is registered (Berger). Along with the registration, firms 
must also file an annual report that releases selected client information (Lauriello, et al. 
2010). The annual report is not to be filed past June 30 of every year, and is to encompass 
a 12-month period starting April 1 of the former calendar year concluding with March 31 
of the calendar year in progress (Berger, 2010). This annual report is to be made available 
to the public on the PCAOB’s website, excepting that information that is considered 
confidential (Berger). In order to receive confidentiality, a firm must request this 
treatment on their registration application (PCAOB, 2012). 
Standards 
 Firms that have completed the registration process with the PCAOB must then 
comply with the standards that the PCAOB has deemed acceptable for both auditing and 
the related verification for issuers (Lauriello, et al. 2010). According to the PCAOB 
website, there are four categories from which all standards are derived: auditing, ethics 
and independence, quality control, and attestation (PCAOB, 2012). Under each of these 
categories, there are certain standards which existed prior to the formation of the 
PCAOB, known as interim standards (PCAOB). There are also a number of new 
standards which either amended pre-existing standards, or were created as the result of 
ineffective policies.  
 Auditing standards. There are fourteen different auditing standards, or AS’s, 
which are available to the public on the PCAOB website (PCAOB, 2012). They 
encompass a wide scope of the auditing process, such as report references, audit 
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planning, materiality considerations, audit evidence, and others (PCAOB). The most 
recent auditing standard, AS 15, began effectiveness on December 15, 2010 (PCAOB). 
AS 5, effective as of November 15, 2007, provides instructions for reporting, which is the 
final stage of any audit (Louwers, 2011). Many of these auditing standards are very 
specific, and then there are those which are more general. In the same fashion as the 
auditing standards, there are the interim standards. These interim standards were accepted 
in April 2003, and are made up of mostly generally accepted auditing standards (PCAOB, 
2012). These standards are quite extensive, including a much larger range of information 
than the regular auditing standards. The interim standards are based on Statements on 
Auditing Standards, or SASs, that have not been amended by the PCAOB’s Auditing 
Standards (Louwers).  
 Ethics and independence. Similar to the auditing portion of the PCAOB 
standards, the ethics and independence portion contains both new rules and interim 
standards. The rules range from 3501 to 3526, but only have nine rules in place (PCAOB, 
2012). The other numerals that have been left out have either been superseded by a later 
numeral, or have become outdated. Underneath the umbrella of those nine rules, eighteen 
additional rules are expanded on the PCAOB website (PCAOB). Some of the ethics and 
independence rules that are currently in place deal with common sense items, while 
others provide more detail in order to prevent particular situations from occurring 
(PCAOB). As simply as individuals might desire for ethical decisions to be made, 
because of so much greed and self-preservation in the world, ethics can go out the 
window. These standards are an attempt to provide guidance and structure to individuals 
who may struggle with maintaining ethical behaviors. The interim standards that are 
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currently in place have been accepted as standards since April of 2003. These rules were 
accepted by the AICPA, American Institute of Certified Public Accountants, and are 
considered to be of as much importance as the rules (PCAOB). 
 Quality control. Unlike the auditing and ethics and independence sections, the 
quality control portion of the PCAOB contains no new rules. This particular section holds 
only the interim standards (PCAOB, 2012). These interim standards are in compliance 
with the AICPA’s standards on quality control, and were accepted in April 2003 
(PCAOB). Quality control only contains three interim standards specifically dealing with 
the topic, but there are also five requirements of membership listed as well (PCAOB). 
These membership requirements stem from the SEC, and involve continuing education 
for all professionals, meeting certain informational requirements, and following proper 
disclosure procedures (PCAOB).  
 Attestation standards. The final section of the PCAOB website that has current 
application to auditors is attestation (PCAOB, 2012). Attestation provides credible 
information to the management of a company (Louwers, 2011). There are six major 
interim standards for the attestation portion of the PCAOB: attest engagements, agreed-
upon procedures engagements, financial forecasts and projections, reporting on pro forma 
financial information, compliance attestation, and managements’ discussions and analysis 
(PCAOB). Each of these standards has its own specific use within the attestation portion. 
An attest engagement occurs when an auditor publishes a report on the financial 
statements that are the responsibility of management (Louwers). In practice, the 
attestation process involves the publication of the auditors’ opinion of the financial 
statements (PCAOB).  
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 Inspections 
 Another important responsibility of the PCAOB is to perform inspections of those 
audit firms which are registered (Lauriello, et al. 2010). These inspections occur annually 
for firms which issue audit reports for more than 100 companies (Lenard, Meonske, & 
Alam, 2009). According to the PCAOB website, this list includes ten firms which are 
inspected annually. They are BDO USA, Crowe Horwath, Deloitte & Touche, Ernst & 
Young, Grant Thornton, KPMG, MaloneBailey, McGladrey & Pullen, ParenteBeard, and 
PricewaterhouseCoopers (PCAOB, 2012). Those firms which deal with less than 100 
companies are inspected once every three years (Lenard, et al.). Since the first inspection 
reports were released in August of 2004, roughly 1,600 inspections have been completed 
(Herron, & Gilbertson, 2011). These inspections included companies in the United States 
and also around the world. The first inspections of those public firms that registered with 
the PCAOB began in 2004 (Lauriello, Leauby, Welsh, 2010). During the course of these 
inspections, essentially all documentation and communications dealing with particular 
audits are exposed to review and evaluation (Lauriello, et al.). If during the performance 
of one of the inspections, an erroneous report is discovered, the PCAOB is authorized to 
take corrective action against the firm (Berger, 2010). There are three different reports 
that may be issued after an inspection: an unqualified, qualified or an adverse inspection 
report (Lenard, et al.). An unqualified report is the best report to receive. This report 
means that no deficiencies are found during the course of the audit inspection (Lenard, et 
al.). The other two types of reports are considered to be negative to receive. A qualified 
report is where one deficiency is found and an adverse report is where two or more 
deficiencies have been found (Lenard, et al.). 
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Enforcement 
 The fourth and final responsibility with which the Public Company Accounting 
Oversight Board has been tasked is enforcement. The PCAOB’s Department of 
Enforcement and Investigations carries out the enforcement program. The program can 
be merely informational or antagonistic in nature (Herron, & Gilbertson, 2009). A 
significant part of the enforcement process is the task of inspection. In addition to 
inspection, there are two other important components: investigations and disciplinary 
actions (Lauriello, et al. 2010). Once the disciplinary actions have been decided, a 
company or individual will either be subject to either a hearing or adjudication. These 
three components will be discussed in the following paragraphs. 
Investigations. Prior to having disciplinary actions take place, the PCAOB 
conducts investigations. These investigations can be either informal inquiries or formal 
investigations (Herron, et al., 2009). The informal inquiry is conventionally used when 
the PCAOB receives a potential violation complaint with minimal additional information 
(Spillane, 2004). A formal investigation is necessary only when adequate information has 
been acquired which provides evidence of a violation (Spillane). Any evidence that is 
obtained through the formal investigation process is considered to be confidential and the 
property of the PCAOB (Herron, et al.). However, the PCAOB has the ability to provide 
said information to the SEC, the U.S. Attorney General, other federal regulators, state 
attorneys general, and appropriate state regulatory authorities (PCAOB, 2012). Once the 
investigation has been completed, then the PCAOB makes the decision to conduct 
disciplinary action. 
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Disciplinary actions. According to Rule 5200 of the PCAOB, disciplinary action 
will only be taken if the alleged individual or company has breached the following: “any 
provision of Sarbanes-Oxley Act, any PCAOB rule, any professional standard, or the 
provisions of the securities laws relating to the preparation and issuance of audit reports 
and the obligations and liabilities of accountants with respect thereto” (Spillane, 2004, 
para. 8). The PCAOB has disciplined sixty-three CPAs or firms since May 2005 (Herron, 
et al., 2011). The primary reason for disciplinary action to be taken on a firm or an 
individual is an act of omission (Herron, et al., 2011). It has been argued by certain 
scholars that the PCAOB is not being as harsh as they could be on certain companies in 
order to protect the limited competition there is in the market today (Lauriello, et al. 
2010).While there are a significant amount of small audit firms in the United States 
currently, there are only four major players: Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu, Ernst&Young, 
KPMG, and PricewaterhouseCoopers (Albu, Albu, Fekete Pali-Pista, & Cuzdriorean 
Vladu, 2011). If one of these firms was to be eliminated, the level of competition would 
be significantly decreased. According to a study performed by David Gilbertson and 
Terri Herron, disciplined firms are more likely to have fewer partners, perform more 
audits on SEC issuers, and have a smaller, less financially sound clientele (Herron, et al.). 
A significant portion of the disciplinary process deals with hearings and adjudication. 
Each firm that has been charged with breaching any of the aforementioned items has the 
option to settle the case outside of court or undergoing litigation (Modesti, 2010). For 
each litigation case, the PCAOB assigns a hearing officer to be in control of the 
proceedings and to issue the initial decision (Spillane, 2004). This initial decision will be 
final excepting the respondent filing a “petition for review” or the board wishing to 
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review said decision (Spillane). The disciplinary actions that could be taken include 
suspension or removal of a firm’s registration, prohibition of an individual to be affiliated 
with a registered firm, or a monetary penalty (PCAOB, 2012). These would only occur if 
the initial decision made by the hearing officer, and ultimately the PCAOB, was 
considered final. At that point only would these disciplinary actions come into play. 
Impact of Sarbanes-Oxley 
Many studies have been conducted since the passing of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act 
concerning the impact of this Act. Some have shown the Act in a negative light due to the 
high costs of compliance (Jain, & Rezaee, 2006). In a study conducted by Jain and 
Rezaee, the costs of meeting the standards imposed by SOX can range from $1 million to 
over $10 million (2006). However, the same study stated that the overall effect of the Act 
was an increase in the wealth of those companies that took the time and effort to comply 
with the requirements (Jain, & Rezaee). Conversely, other studies have shown the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act as a picture of success when considering the advantages of 
compliance (Verleun, Georgakopoulos, Sotiropoulos, & Vasileiou, 2011). During the 
course of the study conducted by Verleun, et al., they realized that the disadvantages of 
the Act must be considered in equal portion to the advantages (2011). Unless this tactic 
was taken, valuable information would be considered immaterial and lost to 
consideration. The conclusion of the study stated that SOX has had an overall positive 
effect on the quality of accounting (Verleun, et al.). Despite many critics who believe that 
such positivity cannot be sustained, the study states that this increase in quality is 
sustainable, based on a five year sample period (Verleun, et al.). In answer to the critique 
that the requirements of SOX are too expensive, some studies have shown that while the 
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initial costs to comply can seem daunting, an average of time to cost balances it out 
(Verleun, et al.). This average is calculated by dividing the amount of costs incurred by a 
particular firm in order to meet the compliance requirements set by SOX by the total 
amount of years that company is believed to survive (Verleun, et al.). While this theory is 
evidenced by only one study in this paper, there are multiple others that could be 
considered. One such study deals with the impact of SOX on “off-balance sheet supply 
chain activities” (Kros & Nadler, 2010, p. 1). The result of this particular study showed 
that the higher the level of compliance with SOX, the greater positivity of the effect on 
the supply chain activities (Kros & Nadler). 
Conclusion 
 The Sarbanes-Oxley Act has caused many companies to reconfigure their 
financial reporting methods completely. These changes have not come without costs, but 
the benefits have many times outweighed the costs. Many companies have benefited from 
the changes, but others have been unable to comply. However, those who have made the 
sacrifices necessary to implement these changes have seen exceptional results. The 
reporting standards as a whole have become more stringent since the implementation of 
SOX, yet the lack of flexibility provides a certain level of structure for companies. This 
structure is incredibly important in a world where nearly anything is permissible. While 
these changes have required intentional adjustment, throughout this past decade the U.S. 
economy has been able to avoid many meltdowns like that of Enron. Many companies 
that have followed the new reporting standards have been able to adapt to the evolution 
of legislation. Those that either could not or would not adapt are no longer in the market. 
There is no perfect fix for any problem or difficulty that will come in the economy. Every 
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instance of illegal activity or poor decision-making often stems from one simple mistake. 
That mistake compounds into something that can never be undone. While legislation is 
not a cure-all for these problems and mistakes, they do provide guidelines. In this writer’s 
opinion, Sarbanes-Oxley was the catalyst for many more pieces of legislation to be 
passed. The long-reaching effects of SOX remain to be seen, yet the evidence from the 
past decade is overwhelmingly positive. Only time will tell what changes will come to be 
in the future of financial reporting. 
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